Every week I am going to put together a short reading list on the conflicts, markets and strategic questions that Crazy Ivan covers. I am not summarising what these pieces say. I’ll tell you why they matter, what they get right, and occasionally where they’re wrong. These are the pieces that you should be reading, but don’t have the time to, that’s where Crazy Ivan steps in.
TLDR
The Iran War has been running for nearly two months. The headline conflict American and Israeli airpower versus Iranian drones and economic coercion has dominated coverage. This week’s reading is about everything else. The secondary effects, the actors managing their positions quietly, the damage after the warfighting. Saudi Arabia hedging it’s bets, China watching the Pacific window, the weakness of the ceasefire, and the helium shortage nobody is talking about. These are the stories underneath the story.
How Saudi Arabia are managing the War: Can Saudi Arabia Keep Hedging?
Foreign Affairs - Maria Fantappie and Vali Nasr - April 20, 2026
Despite not starting the Iran War Saudi Arabia has very specific ambitions for its outcome, particularly maintaining a strategic balance, or tension, between Iran and Israel. While neighbors such as the UAE are acting hawkishly to further their aims in the region, Saudi’s main goal is to hedge their bets; a weak Iran, and a constrained Israel is their goal here. This is why Saudi are facilitating the peace talks through their ally Pakistan. This is a theme in Saudi foreign policy going back to the Soviet-Afghan war where they used their economic clout and reliance to maintain distance from events while still exerting pressure. Rebuilding an entente with both Tehran and Jerusalem is high on their agenda.
The two other things that the war has clarified for Saudi Arabia is their need to remain strategically independent and their economic vulnerability to Iran and its proxies. Part of the Saudi reticence to engage militarily is due to the threat the Houthis pose to the remainder of their energy exports through the Red Sea, hence their desire to maintain balance. The strategic independence however is born of a fear of a resurgent Israel in the aftermath of the Gaza conflict. Israel have shown military strength and intent; a willingness to pursue its goals very aggressively, preemptively and kinetically. There is also the fear that the new Iranian regime (IRGC controlled Khamenei), will similarly be bullish in its ambitions. In the face of this situation Saudi Arabia are reinforcing the coalition of Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan, as opposed to backing some of the other Gulf States aggression towards Iran. Notably, the geography of that alliance constrains both Israel and Iran.
Regarding Saudi vulnerability, beyond the immediate threat to exports, there are several scenarios that Riyadh would find unpalatable. First, the Iranian tollbooth would hurt the Saudi economy by imposing costs on the oil leaving its ports, forcing Saudi to either swallow it, or to build the infrastructure to reroute exports from the Strait. Second, if the conflict resolves into a low level but perpetual nuisance conflict, Saudi, as they have with the Houthis, will likely bear the brunt of the consequences as opposed to the United States or Israel. Finally in the case of massive escalation, Saudi energy production is the biggest target for the Iranian economic coercion strategy. None of these would be good for Saudi Arabia, so their desire to hedge and chart a middle strategy is their best chance of coming out of the Iran War in a strong position.
The consequences of the Iran War for Taiwan: An Opportunity or an Illusion?
The Diplomat - Allen Zhang - April 14, 2026
The American military expenditure in the Gulf has been intensive; billions of dollars, stockpile depletion, the loss of several military aircraft. There has also been a significant redeployment of US forces from the Pacific theater, leading to American capability in the Indo-Pacific being at its lowest ebb in some time. The natural fear here is that this presents an opportunity for China regarding Taiwan, however there has been no military posturing or escalation thus far. The perception however, could be that the US is pre-occupied, and willing to trade Taiwan for interests elsewhere. On the other hand, China’s military preparedness is also at a low ebb, due to high ranking purges, corruption, and decrease in strategic organisation. The Iranian conflict could have the opposite effect on Chinese strategic thinking as well, due to the Trump administration’s willingness to use kinetic force. Chinese strategy in the South China Sea overall has always stopped short of lethal force, so President Trump’s unpredictability could deter Chinese aggression.
Chinese efforts to take Taiwan short of invasion however have been increasing of late. Utilising methods such as persuasion, economic coercion, and limited kinetic operations. On March 18th China attempted to take advantage of the energy shock created by the US (which has disproportionately affected Asian markets) by offering energy guarantees in exchange for peaceful unification. This has occurred alongside Chinese disinformation about Taiwanese energy stores running out. US reconnaissance sorties have decreased by 30% in the Taiwan strait since the Iran War began. If, as seems likely, this conflict continues to draw assets away from the Indo-Pacific, Chinese strategic calculus may begin to change.
Why The Ceasefire is Going to Fail: A Fragile Ceasefire with Iran and the Price of Ending the War
War on the Rocks - Federico Manfredi Firmian & Anthony Wanis-St. John - April 16, 2026
The US and Iran are negotiating via Pakistan, and Israel and Lebanon are negotiating in Washington. However, Israel is still attacking Bint Jbeil in Lebanon and the US and the Iranians have mutually blockaded each other in the Strait of Hormuz. A lasting ceasefire requires less rushed and less public negotiating. As well as a far more specific process that involves state department experts rather than Witkoff and Kushner, whose track record has been poor to say the least. The administration would need to rein in the Israelis and Netanyahu to achieve the conditions for genuine peace talks. However that bumps up against the multiple war thesis.
One of the issues is that the US, Israel and Iran, all have very different war aims, none of which have been achieved. Despite the multiple declarations of victory made by President Trump regarding regime change, and destruction of Iranian military capacity. As I mentioned in my last article, and supported here, the IRGC have taken power using Khamenei as a puppet figure. So rather than installing a friendly regime the US have encouraged the emergence of a hardline militarist regime with genuine grievances against the US to exploit and legitimise themselves. Furthermore the Gulf States are horrified by President Trump’s seeming acquiescence over the Iranian toll in his efforts to wash his hands of the war. The US negotiation stance is in line with Netanyahu’s maximalist positions, which means the negotiations are inherently linked to Israeli war goals rather than American aims. The ceasefire itself is barely holding, and the varying stances of the involved parties mean it is unlikely to hold much longer.
The threat to AI from Iran: The Helium Crisis
The Motley Fool - Micah Zimmerman - April 18, 2026
The oil crisis has been the headline news throughout the entirety of the Iran conflict, however it is hardly the only shortage emanating from the Strait of Hormuz. Fertiliser and metals are other commodity markets being shaken by the conflict. However, while 20% of the worlds oil supply comes through Hormuz, 30-38% of the worlds helium comes from Qatar alone. The facilities at Ras Laffan hit by Iranian Shaheds caused damage that will take 3-5 years to repair. This matters beyond fewer balloons at birthday parties, helium is a key, and irreplaceable, component of semiconductor manufacture. Chip manufacturers don’t have a large stockpile, and 200 specialised containers are stuck behind the Iranian toll booth, so even if the Strait opens tomorrow, it will still take time for this to resolve. Given the competition between AI companies for chips to feed their ever growing LLMs and their data centers, this is a chokepoint that has gone under the radar.
Ultimately the impact on the markets, both short and long term, has been driven by oil prices and the expected TACOs. But there are many more things going on behind the headlines that are going to damage strategy and portfolios for months to come.
I've been watching the helium side too. Very interesting developments. Great piece!