Havana sits powerless 20 hours of the day, every day. Cuba has not received an energy shipment since the Anatoly Kolodkin docked on March 31st. It is a country on the brink of a humanitarian crisis to rival Haiti. This is a crisis made by the United States in an attempt to bring maximum pressure to bear on the Cuban regime. By imposing a blockade and daring Cuba’s allies and NGOs alike to run it, the United States are betting that sooner rather than later the economic consequences will cause the Cuban people to rise up in rebellion. The US is once again attempting its strategy of regime change, or regime capture, in its backyard. A blockade by itself it will not be enough and its result will be to erode US credibility in the region and beyond, as far as the South China Sea.
The Island
Some background first, since 2018 Cuba has been led by Miguel Díaz-Canel, the handpicked successor to Raul Castro. Thus this regime exists in direct continuity with the revolutionary state created by Fidel Castro. Though while Díaz-Canel is the face of the regime he is not its center of gravity. Raul Castro, aged 96, still wields considerable influence over the direction of the Cuban government as the power behind the throne, his surname granting him legitimacy. The other major player and the most important one in any discussion of Cuban regime change is the Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA) which is the vehicle through which the Cuban Armed Forces dominate the Cuban economy, from trade to tourism and the flow of currency. Structurally they have a lot in common with the IRGC, and this is important to understand in terms of regime resilience; those in charge of the Cuban military, and therefore the economy are deeply invested in the survival of this regime. Marco Rubio has identified GAESA as the primary target of US action, this is partially down to the specific US ambitions within Cuba (namely economic access) but also due to GAESA’s key role in running the Cuban state.
The US blockade has created a serious economic crisis. Airports are running out of jet fuel, 20 hour blackouts, and Bloomberg satellite imagery shows a 50% reduction in nighttime illumination. Cuba needs 100k barrels of oil per day to function, domestic production is c. 40k barrels. Cuba was totally reliant on its symbiotic relationship with Venezuela, Cuba would offer military and security assistance to the Venezuelan regime, and in return it would receive discounted oil in breach of the US sanctions. This was part of the American strategic calculus during its regime co-option of Venezuela in that it could begin a domino effect to remove another threat. Since the Venezuela lifeline was shut down Cuba has been receiving a trickle of inbound traffic. Two Mexican navy ships carrying food not fuel, the Sunny Hong out of China carrying rice, and the VLCC (very large crude carrier) Anatoly Kolodkin have been the only ships allowed through the US blockade, and they were all exceptions. The Sunny Hong and the Mexican ships were humanitarian aid, and the Anatoly Kolodkin was a negotiated passage. The simple arithmetic is that Cuba needs 8 VLCCs per month to survive, and they haven’t seen one in three months. Cuba is not being squeezed it is being asphyxiated. With all this being said, while popular discontent is running high in Havana this is not a regime on the brink of collapse but rather an entrenched Praetorian regime with minimal elite fracture under acute external pressure.
Americans in Havana
Sitting 90 miles off the coast of Florida, Cuba has been viewed covetously by every US government since Fidel Castro’s revolution. This latest blockade represents the endgame of the long-held US ambition over the island of Cuba to return it to its status as a client state in the Caribbean basin. There are however many other reasons for American intervention in Cuba. Firstly it would remove Cuba as an outpost for both Russian and Chinese intelligence installations and other military infrastructure, which given its location is critical to national defence. Removing GAESA from their position at the apex of Cuba’s economy would open a new and profitable market for the US as any regime co-option would almost certainly favor US businesses. There are large nickel and cobalt reserves on the island, and in the current geopolitical climate a local and controlled source of metals would be an asset to the US. Finally taking control of Cuba would allow the US to halt the consistent illegal migration of Cuban nationals to their shores. This blend of domestic political benefit and great power conflict is archetypal of the ‘Donroe Doctrine’, the expression of President Trump’s ambitions in the western hemisphere.
The Donroe Doctrine
The Donroe Doctrine is in a direct intellectual lineage with its namesake Monroe Doctrine wherein geopolitical rivals are excluded from the western hemisphere, autonomy is limited for Latin American states, and US interests are protected by gunboat diplomacy. It however also bears a resemblance to the United Fruit model of the 1950s turning US allies into Banana Republics. Where the entire ecosystem of the hemisphere was extractive in nature and compliant to the United States. The Donroe doctrine is the synthesis of these two ideas, and taking Cuba in some form would be a clear expression of its tenets. Those tenets being to exclude China from the region and to open economies to US investment and control. We can see this doctrine clearly in the US co-option of the Venezuelan regime and we can see the groundwork being laid for it in Cuba. The downside of these doctrines is that the wave of socialist thought that swept across Latin America and the Caribbean basin was in direct response to decades of coercive US control.
The Impact of the Blockade
During the Cold War the Soviet Union acted as patrón to the Cuban state, followed by Venezuela, as well as to an extent, China and Putin’s Russia. Cuba relies on imports and patronage to survive as most poorer island states do. After the US co-option of Venezuela and the imposition of the new blockade no one has yet stood up as Cuba’s new patrón. In terms of regional solidarity the lack of support shows the strength of the Donroe Doctrine and President Trump’s economic coercion strategy. The two primary socialist governments in Latin America, Lula’s Brazil and Claudia Sheinbaum’s Mexico have been notably quiet, with Mexico sending only two ships worth of humanitarian aid and Lula unwilling to jeopardize his newly stable relationship with President Trump. China and Russia have also not attempted to flex their geopolitical muscle and test American resolve over the blockade. Their silence and inaction is the Donroe doctrine in full effect.
Maximum Pressure
The primary weapon of the Donroe Doctrine is to cause enough economic pain to generate popular discontent and from this discontent comes revolution. The primary issue with the US blockade is that this idea is fundamentally wrong, without elite fracture maximum pressure cannot generate regime change. American success in Venezuela hinging on capturing Maduro rather than the years of heavy sanctions demonstrates that. No doubt the 20 hour blackouts, collapsing currency and economy and imminent starvation will create significant protests dwarfing those of 2021. However, much like Iran, the Cuban regime is deeply structured, and the entire elite base is deeply invested in regime survival. The ultimate result of maximum pressure is more likely to be the entrenchment of the regime that will skew more repressive and the creation of a humanitarian crisis. It is important to realize that GAESA is not regime adjacent or a partner, it is in many ways the primary actor in the regime. Alfred Stepan’s civil-military framework makes the distinction between states where the military is both separate and subordinate to the civilian government, such as most liberal democracies, and those states where the military’s relationship with the government is one of control or at least consent. Cuba is a state where the distinction between GAESA, FAR, and the administration is blurred. The result of this for us, is that where in liberal states economic pain filters through civilian institutions to enact regime change. Cuba, as a Praetorian regime with far-reaching control over the economy will respond to economic suffering with repression and a tightening of control. The other issue here is that the Venezuelan campaign has given the US a false understanding of the ease of regime change. Replacing Maduro with Delcy Rodriguez was easy because Chavismo was a patrimonial system more than an ideological one. In Cuba the GAESA officer corps is loyal to the system and to the institutions rather than to Díaz-Canel. The mechanism by which fracture occurs in these crises doesn’t exist in the Cuban system. In Venezuela the interests of the elites could be protected even with a change in leader as their financial assets and benefits from the regime were hardly affected. However in Cuba not only is the regime significantly more ideological but with GAESA’s control of the economy the interests of the elites are only served by regime continuity. The American strategy of maximum pressure will only serve to consolidate the resolve of the Cuban elites, who are more likely to shoot protestors than to surrender to Washington.
Deals not Doctrines
The Cuba problem exposes an inherent flaw in the Donroe Doctrine. The administration doesn’t have a Cuba strategy as much as it has a Cuba policy. In the absence of a grand strategy different factions within the administration compete for support by promising easy wins at a low cost, with upside domestically. Marco Rubio, the son of Cuban exiles, is notable in this case by leading the hardliners who wish to topple the regime, dismantle GAESA, and treat Cuba as the next domino after Venezuela. On the other hand there is clearly a faction dedicated to regime change, with CIA Director John Ratcliffe meeting Raúl Castro’s grandson in an attempt to make him Cuba’s answer to Delcy Rodriguez; someone under US influence who retains enough legitimacy and continuation within the ancien regime to take power. The result of two competing strategies is not a synthesis it is the pursuit of incompatible objectives, you cannot encourage a negotiated deal and transition while driving a nation to the brink of starvation. This incoherence is noticeable in Venezuela, where the pro-democracy faction watched the United States support the Chavist regime, its noticeable in Iran, where the pro-regime change faction watched Donald Trump sign a deal excluding Israel from the peace process. The operating logic of this administration lies somewhere between opportunism and dissonance, and it runs on deals not doctrines.
Littoral Competition
This logic reflects David Kilcullen’s littoral theory which provides the context for how and where the Donroe Doctrine is playing out. The short version is that several mega-trends are concentrating population, trade and therefore power in littoral urban zones and chokepoints. We have seen this in terms of the way the US capture of Maduro was launched from US Navy vessels meaning that it was littoral combat; and we have seen it in the Strait of Hormuz as the IRGC’s control of the Hormuz coast has granted them leverage far exceeding their military force. Control of the littoral as opposed to controlling territory is going to be the critical geo-strategic challenge of the coming years. Both in terms of how the US is enforcing maximum pressure on the Cuban regime and the logic of why are based in this understanding. A separate example within the Caribbean basin is that of Panama and the CK Hutchinson ports at either end of the canal. The rhetoric Trump used was deeply couched in the Donroe Doctrine, with language focusing on reclamation but the strategic target was regaining control of a littoral chokepoint. Despite pressure Panama is still an active contest with Chinese security systems and software running Tocumen airport which is one of the largest cargo hubs in Central America. Hence the ongoing US pressure on Panama both legally and diplomatically. However Cuba and Panama are not isolated cases; gaining control over littoral zones is happening across the globe. For example an illegal blockade on an independent island that poses an ideological threat to a regime might be a precedent that the United States do not want to set; as it may encourage China to make a move for Taiwan. China are in essence running a similar campaign of pressure on Taiwan. But given Taiwan’s development rather than create a humanitarian crisis they are focusing on propaganda and military harassment. During the height of the Hormuz crisis Chinese propaganda towards Taiwan was focused on convincing the Taiwanese people that they were on the verge of running out of energy, reinforcing their unique vulnerability. Thus if President Trump sets a new precedent for a blockade against other superpowers as a form of grey zone littoral warfare, what exactly would stop China?
Taiwan Transactions
At the Trump-Xi summit in May President Trump made a comment that Taiwan ‘stole’ the US chip industry. The transactional nature of the Trump administration’s foreign policy must surely look like weakness and an opportunity to Xi. The strategic incoherence is here as well, as Trump’s comments have done nothing to change the recent US arms sales and reassurance to Taiwan, there are likely factions within the administration as there are on Cuba. Incoherent motive does not produce incoherent signal however. Beijing is primarily analysing outcomes and precedent: ships turned back, a suffocating regime, and wanton sanctions. A chaotic policy still produces a legible pattern, which Xi is reading.
The American policy focused rather than strategic approach to the Taiwan issue raises the question of what the US would do if confronted with a Chinese blockade similar to that of Cuba. While no Chinese ship has yet tried to run the US blockade the US would almost certainly attempt to break a Chinese blockade, and it would be interesting given the Cuban precedent as well as recent events in the Strait of Hormuz as to how that would evolve diplomatically. There is also an arsenal problem beyond the political one. Trumps war with Iran, on much the same principles as the Donroe Doctrine and Cuba created a military shortfall that cannot be quickly remedied; every THAAD, Patriot missile, and interceptor expended over Tel-Aviv and Dubai is one that leaves Taipei slightly more exposed. Moreover the US will prioritise its own arsenal over those of allies, the interceptor asymmetry will favor China in any limited kinetic exchange. It is however the precedent that seems most dangerous. Much like the CIA faction in the US administration and Rául Castro’s grandson China could seek to place someone like Kuomintang leader Cheng Li-Wun, to maintain continuity and ensure peaceful transition. This is something that the US would also fail to counter diplomatically with any real credibility as co-opting a regime through a junior member of it is another Donroe Doctrine move. The precedent of transitioning a blockade and pressure into genuine regime capture is possibly less damaging than the US demonstrating that it is a legitimate strategy for excising rivals from your littoral region. It is possible then that the Hormuz related propaganda spike was the opening gambit regarding Taiwan, much as the indictment of Castro and the sanctions on Cuban officials were for Cuba. We should point out there are significant differences here, the US have a much more effective blue water navy and the ability to project power, and Taiwan is significantly more strategically important to the US than Cuba is to China. But this is not a moralist or an equivocating argument but rather a credibility one, if the US turn Russian and Chinese ships back from Cuba they will have set a precedent and a model that can be used against them. So while China may be playing a slower game because the costs and risks of a Taiwan blockade are much higher, they may still be reading from the same playbook.
Conclusion
The Cuban blockade has the potential to have consequences for US interests and credibility from Cuba, through the Panama Canal and all the way to the South China Sea. A flawed strategy that, much like the Iran War, will reinforce the entrenched ideological regime in Havana rather than create the elite fracture that true regime change would need. This was never a debate about the Cuba policy, it is the another test of the Donroe Doctrine, first Venezuela, and now Cuba. The test is whether the transactional style of President Trump and maximum pressure can be credibly enforced, and the exclusion of rivals and extraction of resources carried out in the western hemisphere is plausible strategy. Whatever Washington’s plans, Beijing is watching for the outcome, both in terms of their interests in the Caribbean basin and for the efficacy of a regional hegemon’s blockade. Deals not doctrines was supposed to be a negotiating stance, in Havana it may become a weakness to be exploited.
Great write-up. I wonder how success in this matter would reframe the Trump presidency domestically. Gonna share this in some political chats and see how it does.