I'm congolese and this is the most elobrative article ever written on the geopolitics of the current great lakes regional wars on Congo. Two questions;where can I find more of these information & sources you've pulled as well as what do you think of recent Israel partnership & the DRC?
Hi BB, so for most of the facts and figures I rely on UN and humanitarian agencies, as well as heavily on Critical Threats and the Council for Foreign Relations, which are great conflict trackers. In terms of the Israeli-DRC bilateral talks, it would take a long time for Israeli weaponry/training to make any real difference on the battlefield given the issues with the FARDC. I would be curious to see how it affects DRC's relationship with its traditional allies, and the African Union as Tshisekedi is quite outspoken on Israel. I think it could well be linked to the US negotiations as he was very specifically in favour of Trump's Gaza peace plan, so there are a bunch of things to watch but I don't think it shifts the calculus in the Kivus.
Wow wasn’t expecting such an In depth response. With the issue with FARDC do you mean their current weakened disposition related to the Mobutu regime that was mentioned in the article or is there a deeper analysis? From my understanding they’ve been pushing this narrative that FARDC is not weak but are simply stretched out. The funds are there but the country is fighting two different battles from Kivu to Ituri(which is rarely mentioned) so the excuse is they have their hands tied. Also thank you for the sources & your whole page is an absolute gem.
Thanks. To answer your question, its not that the FARDC (or the Wazalendo militias) are weak currently, they are weak full stop. That has been built into the structure of the Congolese military since Mobutu so that it cannot plausibly challenge presidential power in a pronunciamento. It is a feature of the system not a bug, excuses aside. It is deliberate weakness, which protects the government rather than the people.
Very interesting piece. President Tshisekedi’s “minerals for security” approach, inviting Western investors to break the Chinese coltan and cobalt monopoly while simultaneously pushing for copper and cobalt to be smelted on Congolese soil is good for investment but the humanitarian situation for millions remains devastating especially with the new Ebola epidemic.
The framing of Rwanda as a modern Condottieri state relying on elite military leverage to secure tolerance for its proxy operations in North Kivu offers an exceptionally sharp perspective on this crisis.
What stands out most in the current phase is how the global rush for critical minerals has effectively locked all players into the acceptance of this mineral-washing architecture. As long as the supply lines for tantalum, copper, and cobalt remain uninterrupted and the regional security burden is offloaded to Kigali, the incentive structure for Washington, Beijing, or Brussels to disrupt this profitable equilibrium stays virtually non-existent.
Terrible situation. Trying to think what knocks it out of profitable equilibrium- M23 wanting to establish a separate country or join Rwanda. (Territorial integrity) or some change in Rwanda’s relations with China or the US. What changes it?
Hi Charlie, that is a great question. I don’t think Kigali or M23 would profit from changing this system, deniability being an important aspect of the whole enterprise. Nor do I think China or the US are going to pressurise a situation they are benefitting from. What I would be waiting for is a fragmentation of the AFC-M23 coalition since they have different goals. The AFC wanting regime change, and M23 wanting consolidation, that gap could really throw things off. Alternatively a failure of Tshisekedi’s coup-proofing leading to divisions in the Congolese armed forces and a loss of control over the provinces could also force China or the US to recalculate.
The thing with a fragmentation is that AFC doesn't have much of an army of its own beyond defected and captured former FARDC, many of whom are officered/led by Joseph Kabila's boys. But like the rest of the FARDC, these defectors and converted captives, cannot actually fight. The only other fighting force - i.e can actually fight - in the AFC/M23 coalition is the Banyamulenge Twirwaneho militia, and while they are politically more aligned with the Kabila-AFC position (regine change in Kinshasa), being Congolese nationalists; I don't quite see them being willing to march all the way to Kinshasa again, especially for Kabila and Nangaa.
The Banyamulenge people are aware that ultimately the rest of the DRC will scapegoat them as restoring Kabila for Rwanda, and even Kabila may turn on them at the end. They are more concerned with mai-mai militias that would like to genocide Banyamulenge, than supporting Kabila and Nangaa to remove Tshisekedi.
A coup is unlikely, but more likely to be internal than AFC driven. A split in the AFC-M23 coalition is probably where any change will come from, but yes ultimately de facto is the most likely medium term outcome
I'm congolese and this is the most elobrative article ever written on the geopolitics of the current great lakes regional wars on Congo. Two questions;where can I find more of these information & sources you've pulled as well as what do you think of recent Israel partnership & the DRC?
Hi BB, so for most of the facts and figures I rely on UN and humanitarian agencies, as well as heavily on Critical Threats and the Council for Foreign Relations, which are great conflict trackers. In terms of the Israeli-DRC bilateral talks, it would take a long time for Israeli weaponry/training to make any real difference on the battlefield given the issues with the FARDC. I would be curious to see how it affects DRC's relationship with its traditional allies, and the African Union as Tshisekedi is quite outspoken on Israel. I think it could well be linked to the US negotiations as he was very specifically in favour of Trump's Gaza peace plan, so there are a bunch of things to watch but I don't think it shifts the calculus in the Kivus.
Wow wasn’t expecting such an In depth response. With the issue with FARDC do you mean their current weakened disposition related to the Mobutu regime that was mentioned in the article or is there a deeper analysis? From my understanding they’ve been pushing this narrative that FARDC is not weak but are simply stretched out. The funds are there but the country is fighting two different battles from Kivu to Ituri(which is rarely mentioned) so the excuse is they have their hands tied. Also thank you for the sources & your whole page is an absolute gem.
Thanks. To answer your question, its not that the FARDC (or the Wazalendo militias) are weak currently, they are weak full stop. That has been built into the structure of the Congolese military since Mobutu so that it cannot plausibly challenge presidential power in a pronunciamento. It is a feature of the system not a bug, excuses aside. It is deliberate weakness, which protects the government rather than the people.
Very interesting piece. President Tshisekedi’s “minerals for security” approach, inviting Western investors to break the Chinese coltan and cobalt monopoly while simultaneously pushing for copper and cobalt to be smelted on Congolese soil is good for investment but the humanitarian situation for millions remains devastating especially with the new Ebola epidemic.
The framing of Rwanda as a modern Condottieri state relying on elite military leverage to secure tolerance for its proxy operations in North Kivu offers an exceptionally sharp perspective on this crisis.
What stands out most in the current phase is how the global rush for critical minerals has effectively locked all players into the acceptance of this mineral-washing architecture. As long as the supply lines for tantalum, copper, and cobalt remain uninterrupted and the regional security burden is offloaded to Kigali, the incentive structure for Washington, Beijing, or Brussels to disrupt this profitable equilibrium stays virtually non-existent.
Terrible situation. Trying to think what knocks it out of profitable equilibrium- M23 wanting to establish a separate country or join Rwanda. (Territorial integrity) or some change in Rwanda’s relations with China or the US. What changes it?
Hi Charlie, that is a great question. I don’t think Kigali or M23 would profit from changing this system, deniability being an important aspect of the whole enterprise. Nor do I think China or the US are going to pressurise a situation they are benefitting from. What I would be waiting for is a fragmentation of the AFC-M23 coalition since they have different goals. The AFC wanting regime change, and M23 wanting consolidation, that gap could really throw things off. Alternatively a failure of Tshisekedi’s coup-proofing leading to divisions in the Congolese armed forces and a loss of control over the provinces could also force China or the US to recalculate.
The thing with a fragmentation is that AFC doesn't have much of an army of its own beyond defected and captured former FARDC, many of whom are officered/led by Joseph Kabila's boys. But like the rest of the FARDC, these defectors and converted captives, cannot actually fight. The only other fighting force - i.e can actually fight - in the AFC/M23 coalition is the Banyamulenge Twirwaneho militia, and while they are politically more aligned with the Kabila-AFC position (regine change in Kinshasa), being Congolese nationalists; I don't quite see them being willing to march all the way to Kinshasa again, especially for Kabila and Nangaa.
The Banyamulenge people are aware that ultimately the rest of the DRC will scapegoat them as restoring Kabila for Rwanda, and even Kabila may turn on them at the end. They are more concerned with mai-mai militias that would like to genocide Banyamulenge, than supporting Kabila and Nangaa to remove Tshisekedi.
So basically if Congolese government is under threat from the AFC or allies and needs support. Otherwise it remains de facto as is now.
A coup is unlikely, but more likely to be internal than AFC driven. A split in the AFC-M23 coalition is probably where any change will come from, but yes ultimately de facto is the most likely medium term outcome
Thank you. Much appreciated this article.